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Abstract
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is widely used in investigations of decision making. A growing number of studies have linked
performance on this task to personality differences, with the aim of explaining the large degree of variability in healthy
individuals’ performance of the task. However, this line of research has yielded inconsistent results. In the present study, we
tested whether increasing the conflict between short-term and long-term gains in the IGT can clarify personality-related
modulations of decision making. We assessed performance on the original IGT as a function of the personality traits typically
involved in risky decision making (i.e., impulsivity, sensation seeking, sensitivity to reward and punishment). The impact of
these same personality traits was also evaluated on a modified version of the task in which the difference in immediate
reward magnitude between disadvantageous and advantageous decks was increased, while keeping the net gain fixed. The
results showed that only in this latter IGT variant were highly impulsive individuals and high sensation seekers lured into
making disadvantageous choices. The opposite seems to be the case for participants who were highly sensitive to
punishment, although further data are needed to corroborate this finding. The present preliminary results suggest that the
IGT variant used in this study could be more effective than the original task at identifying personality effects in decision
making. Implications for dispositional and situational effects on decision making are discussed.
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Introduction
A remarkable body of data on decision making has been
collected using an apparently simple paradigm that requires the
subject to select cards from decks that vary in both the probability
and the extent of potential wins and losses – the Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT, [1]). Crucially, this task entails resolving a conflict
situation since, in order to achieve advantageous outcomes in the
long-term, participants must select disadvantageous options in the
short-term. The IGT was developed primarily to investigate
impaired decision making in patients with frontal lobe damage; it
has nonetheless also been used in countless studies that have
investigated non-clinical samples. In this respect, a growing
number of studies have recently linked IGT performance to
personality differences as they have attempted to explain the large
degree of variability in the performance of healthy individuals.
Preliminary findings have suggested that specific personality traits
can impact IGT performance, although results are often
conflicting. Many studies have investigated this task by considering
individual differences in the subjects’ susceptibility to incoming
rewards and punishments [2], coherent with IGT’s reliance on
reward/punishment schedules. Although some studies detected a
negative impact of these personality traits on IGT performance,
the findings are inconsistent [3–6]. Similarly incongruous results
have been observed in studies that focus on the relationship
between IGT performance and impulsivity – a trait that is typically
involved when conflicting short-term and long-term incentives are
embedded in the task. Despite findings in clinical samples that
seem to consistently support a link between impulsivity and
dysfunctional choice behavior, the data from non-clinical samples
are far from conclusive. Some studies have shown impulsivity to
have a significant detrimental effect on IGT performance [4,7–
11]; in other studies, however, no such relationship between
impulsivity and IGT performance has emerged [5,12,13].
Inconsistent effects have also been reported for Zuckerman’s
Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS; [14]), which assesses how prone an
individual is to exhibiting risky behaviors and making risky
choices. Findings on this trait range from negative associations
between IGT performance and specific facets of sensation seeking
[8,15], to null associations [3,13,16], or even to unexpected,
positive associations between gains and the total SSS [17].
A full review of the research devoted to establishing associations
between IGT performance and personality is beyond the scope of
the present study. However, the brief literature survey presented
above clearly suggests some measure of empirical inconsistency is
present in the results thus far reported. Although the robustness of
the IGT for investigating impaired decision making in clinical
samples is well established, it could be argued that some specific
features of the original IGT are less than ideal for detecting
personality effects on healthy individuals’ decision-making pro-
cesses. In the present research, we hypothesize that a change in the
original IGT reinforcement schedule aimed at increasing the
degree of conflict between short-term and long-term gains could
result in personality traits exerting more reliable effects on task
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performance. Therefore, we compared performance on the
original IGT with performance on a modified version of the task
introduced by Van den Bos and colleagues [18]. In this IGT
variant (IGT-v), the difference in immediate reward magnitude
between disadvantageous and advantageous decks was larger than
in the original IGT. More specifically, the ratio of immediate
rewards between disadvantageous and advantageous decks in the
original IGT was 2:1 (disadvantageous decks allowed one to gain
J100 per selection, advantageous decks J50 per selection),
whereas the ratio in the IGT-v was 6:1 (disadvantageous decks
allowed one to gain J300 per selection, advantageous decks J50
per selection). To assess the influence of the conflict between short-
term and long-term gains on decision making, the immediate
losses realized in disadvantageous decks were also increased to
maintain a long-term net gain in those decks that would be
identical to that of the original IGT.
Preliminary results, achieved in small, non-clinical samples,
showed that this task variant severely impaired performance [18].
However, the effects of personality on this task have not yet been
considered, despite the fact that the difficulties experienced when
the conflict between short- and long-term gains increases
effectively mimicked real-life situations in which personality has
been shown to play a critical role in shaping decisions (e.g., health-
risk circumstances, gambling contexts, etc.). To the best of our
knowledge, the present study is the first to test the effects of
sensitivity to rewards and punishments, impulsivity and sensation
seeking on both IGT and IGT-v performance. We anticipate that
the simple increase in immediate rewards/losses in disadvanta-
geous decks in the IGT-v can disclose the effects of personality on
decision making more effectively than can the reinforcement
schedule of the original IGT.
Specifically, whereas it was difficult to predict sizeable effects of
personality on IGT performance given the inconsistent evidence
reported in the extant literature, we anticipated poorer perfor-
mance among participants with high reward sensitivity in the
IGT-v, since they can plausibly be described as being more
sensitive to the increased immediate rewards of the disadvanta-
geous decks. We expected similar poor performance on the IGT-v
by highly impulsive participants, both because they can be more
attracted to the increased immediate rewards of disadvantageous
decks and because their distinctive planning deficits may be
emphasized by the reward schedule of this task version. High
sensation seekers were also expected to perform less efficiently on
the IGT-v because the manipulation of the reinforcement schedule
was thought to be likely to enhance the arousal produced by
disadvantageous decks. In contrast, we anticipated better perfor-
mance on the IGT-v among participants who were more sensitive
to punishments, since the increased immediate losses of disadvan-
tageous decks can induce such individuals to disregard such decks
in order to avoid the anxiety generated by the prospect of losses.
Methods
Ethics statement
All participants gave their written, informed consent to take part
in the study, which was performed after receiving approval from
the University of Bologna, Department of Psychology Ethics
Committee and in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration.
Participants and Procedure
One hundred and seventy participants took part in the study.
However, five participants were excluded due to problems related
to questionnaire completion; therefore, the final sample included
165 volunteers (mean age: 26.47, sd 67.14 years; 58.8%
university undergraduate students, 41.2% workers). Participants
were informed that they would be participating in a card game
with fictitious payoffs and were randomly assigned to perform
either the original (IGT) or the modified version (IGT-v) of the
Iowa Gambling Task. They then completed a booklet that
included several personality questionnaires (see below), which were
pseudo-randomized across participants.
Measures
Tasks. Decision making was assessed using two computerized
versions of the Iowa Gambling Task – the IGT and the IGT-v.
In the IGT [1], participants were required to maximize their
gains by choosing one card at a time from any of 4 decks, across
100 trials, starting from a specific amount of virtual money
(J2,000). Participants were only aware that decks varied in their
probability and magnitude of wins and losses, and that some decks,
being less advantageous than others, would need to be avoided if
they were to maximize their earnings. Two decks (i.e., decks C and
D) were advantageous, leading the subject to immediately win and
lose small amounts, with an eventual net gain (+ J250 per block of
10 cards); the remaining two decks (i.e., decks A and B) were
disadvantageous, leading subjects to immediately win and lose
large amounts, with an eventual net loss (2 J250 per block of 10
cards). In accordance with the original IGT [1], the frequency of
gains and losses in advantageous and disadvantageous decks was
balanced. Namely, five of every ten trials generated a loss in decks
A and C, whereas one in ten trials generated a loss in decks B and
D. Participants did not know the rewards and punishments
associated with each deck at the outset, but were able to learn it
because they received visual feedback immediately after each
selection, and were informed on the amount of money won or lost.
In the IGT-v [18] the ratio of immediate rewards between
disadvantageous and advantageous decks differed from that in the
original IGT. Specifically, in the original IGT the ratio was 2:1,
whereas in the IGT-v the ratio was 6:1 (see Introduction section). In
order to keep the net gain fixed with respect to that of the original
IGT, the magnitude of immediate losses in the disadvantageous
decks of the IGT-v was increased accordingly.
Personality questionnaires. The Behavioral Inhibition
System (BIS) and Behavioral Approach System (BAS) Question-
naires [19,20] were used to index sensitivity to punishments and
rewards. These included 20 items, each rated on a 5-point scale
and comprising four different subscales: (1) Sensitivity to Punish-
ments (BIS-Anxiety), (2) positive responses to the occurrence/
anticipation of rewards (BAS Reward Responsiveness), (3)
persistence in the pursuit of reward (BAS Drive), (4) desire for
novel rewards and a willingness to approach potentially rewarding
situations (BAS Fun Seeking). Although a total BAS score, which
sums the scores of the three BAS subscales, is often used,
theoretical and psychometric evidence has suggested that it is best
to consider these scales separately, as they refer to dissociable
features of Reward Sensitivity [21,22].
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, [23,24]) was used to
assess impulsivity. It consists of 30 items, each rated on a 4-point
scale. The BIS-11 total score is computed by summing the scores
of the three subscales that measure related facets of impulsivity: (1)
a tendency to act without forethought in the spur of the moment
(Motor Impulsiveness), (2) an orientation to the present or a lack of
planning for the future (Non-Planning), and (3) difficulty in
maintaining attention or concentration (Attentional Impulsive-
ness).
The Sensation Seeking Scale, version V (SSS-V, [14]), was used
to measure individual preferences for arousing and stimulating
activities and experiences. It consists of 40 pairs of antithetical
Individual Differences and Decision Making
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items and assesses the subject’s tendency to engage in both
dangerous/adventurous activities and new mental and sensory
experiences, the subject’s interest in socially and sexually
disinhibited activities, and the subject’s aversion to routine and
repetitive activities. Higher scores in the SSS-V indicate a higher
degree of sensation seeking.
Data analysis
In both task versions, in order to check for the presence of
learning effects, analyses of trials grouped in five blocks (each block
consisting of 20 consecutive trials) were performed using the net
score as a dependent variable. This was computed as the difference
between advantageous and disadvantageous deck selections, with a
positive net score indicating more advantageous selections. We
first examined participants’ performance independent of person-
ality variables through an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA),
specifying the five Blocks of net score as a within-group factor,
Gender and Task Version (IGT vs. IGT-v) as between-group factors,
and Age as a covariate (being this significantly different between
females and males, see Results section). We then considered
performance as a function of personality by performing, for each
of the six measured traits, an ANCOVA with the same factors as
above and the additional factor Group, obtained by splitting the
volunteers according to the median score of the trait. Type-1 error
for the 6 ANCOVAs was controlled for by setting the significance
threshold at the level of p = 0.008 (i.e. p = .05/6). The Greenhouse
– Geisser correction was applied when necessary and significant
effects were explored using Tukey HSD post-hoc tests for unequal
samples. In addition, Pearson correlations between personality
traits and total net score were computed for each version of the
task. To gauge the unique contribution of each trait to behavioral
decision making, hierarchical regression analyses were performed
– separately for each task version – by regressing the total net score
on the self-reported traits. Gender and age were entered into the
equation first, as statistical controls.
In order to detect the presence of effects in the gain-loss
frequency dimension (i.e., decks A and C: loss in 50% of the trials
vs. decks B and D: loss in 10% of the trials), we analyzed the
number of selections from each deck during the entire task
performance. In this regard, particular attention was devoted to
the preference, if any, for deck B – an effect known as ‘‘prominent
deck B’’ [10,25], an index of irrational decision making sometimes
reported among healthy participants. We therefore first examined
participants’ performance independent of personality variables,
through an ANCOVA, specifying the 4 Deck Selection as a within-
group factor, Gender and Task Version as between-group factors, and
Age as a covariate. We then considered performance as a function
of personality by performing ANCOVAs analogous to those
previously described for the analyses in the gain-loss magnitude
dimension.
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the total sample and
for males and females separately. T-tests revealed that females
were slightly younger and had higher BIS-Anxiety scores than did
males, whereas males had significantly higher SSS-V scores. No
gender differences were detected in task performance for either
IGT version. Participants assigned to the original IGT (N = 84)
and to IGT-v (N = 81) were equivalent in terms of gender
distribution, age, and personality traits (all ps .0.05).
Net score analyses
The ANCOVA focused on learning effects revealed Block to
have a significant main effect (F(4,640) = 5.15, g
2 = 0.03, p = 0.001:
the first block showed a significantly lower mean net score
compared with the net score of all other blocks: the second block
showed a mean net score significantly lower compared with the net
scores of the fourth and fifth blocks, ; and the third block showed a
net score lower than that of the fifth block (m6se of the net score
in the five blocks: 24.4360.42; 0.1460.52; 1.1760.65;
3.0660.69; 3.6260.74; p,0.01, Tukey HSD post-hoc tests).
The main effect of Task Version was also significant (F(1,160)
= 11.67, g2 = 0.07, p = 0.001), with the IGT-v characterized by a
significantly lower mean net score per block (i.e., total net score
divided by five blocks) than that of the original IGT (m6se:
20.6460.56 and 2.0660.55, respectively). The two-way Block by
Task Version interaction was not significant (F(4,640) = 1.63,
g2 = 0.01, ns), a result that suggests that participants learned the
advantageous choice strategy in both versions, considering the
Block main effect. The two-way Gender x Task Version
interaction approached statistical significance (F(1,160) = 3.23,
g2 = 0.02, p = 0.07): females performed comparably in both
versions (Females, IGT net score = 1.2560.71; Females, IGT-v
net score = 0.0260.73; ns), whereas males performed significantly
better in the classic IGT than in the IGT-v (Males, IGT net score
= 2.8460.87; Males, IGT-v net score = 21.2660.87; p,0.01). In
addition, a complex, three-way interaction, Gender x Task
Version x Block, was found to be significant (F(4,640) = 2.62,
g2 = 0.02, p = 0.041, see Figure 1). Post-hoc comparisons showed
gender differences in the fifth block to be a function of IGT
version: females’ performance was the same irrespective of task
version (females’ IGT net score in the fifth block = 2.9761.44;
females’ IGT-v net score in the fifth block = 3.02. 61.51), whereas
a remarkable decline in performance was observed for males in
IGT-v as compared to IGT (males’ IGT net score in the fifth
block = 8.1961.51; males’ IGT-v net score in the fifth block
= 0.3161.53; p,0.001).
ANCOVAs that included the effects of personality variables did
not yield significant results for the BIS-BAS scales (all ps .0.05).
We did detect, however, a main effect of Impulsivity (F(1,156)
= 9.89, g2 = 0.06, p = 0.002), as measured by the BIS-11, which
was qualified by the significant Impulsivity x Task Version
interaction (F(1,156) = 7.52, g
2 = 0.05, p = 0.007, see Figure 2A).
Post-hoc tests showed that highly impulsive individuals were
characterized by poorer performance than less impulsive individ-
uals only in the IGT-v (p = 0.0003).
The Impulsivity x Block interaction was also significant (F(4,624)
= 4.96, g2 = 0.03, p = 0.001), indicating that more impulsive
participants recorded significantly lower net scores than did less
impulsive participants only in the fourth (p = 0.009) and fifth blocks
(p = 0.01). Further analyses were performed with the purpose of
establishing the possible contribution of the three BIS-11 subscales
to the effect found for total Impulsivity. Such analyses revealed
that Attentional Impulsiveness did not show any significant effect
(all ps .0.05). Motor Impulsiveness showed a significant interac-
tion with Task Version (F(1,156) = 4.20, g
2 = 0.03, p = 0.042),
similar to that found for total Impulsivity. Non-Planning showed
the same three significant effects identified for total Impulsivity,
thus emerging as the principal source of total Impulsivity effects –
i.e., Non-Planning main effect (F(1,156) = 16.60, g
2 = 0.10,
p = 0.0001); Non-Planning x Task Version (F(1,156) = 4.01,
g2 = 0.02, p = 0.047); and Non-Planning x Block (F(4,624) = 3.07,
g2 = 0.02, p = 0.02).
A noteworthy interaction between Sensation Seeking and Task
Version was found (F(1,156) = 6.95, g
2 = 0.04, p = 0.009; see
Individual Differences and Decision Making
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Figure 2B). Although it failed to achieve full statistical significance
after our correction (p = 0.008), this finding was explicitly
anticipated in our hypotheses, and thus was considered to be
worth mention. Post-hoc tests revealed that high sensation seekers
performed worse than low sensation seekers only in the IGT-v
(p = 0.02).
Correlations among personality measures and the total net score
for the two IGT versions are reported in Table 2.
Total net score in the original IGT was only negatively
associated with the Non-planning facet of Impulsivity. In contrast,
the total net score in the IGT-v showed significant negative
correlations with several personality dimensions, including Sensa-
tion Seeking as well as Impulsivity total score and its three
subscales, Motor Impulsivity, Non-Planning and Attentional
Impulsivity. In line with these findings, we also found a negative
correlation between IGT-v net score and BAS Fun Seeking.
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses, which aimed to test
the net effects of the traits under investigation on behavioral
decision making, further showed that IGT-v was more effective
than IGT at revealing the influence of personality on decision
making. For the original IGT, the overall regression model
(corrected R2 = 0.107; F(10,73) = 1.99, p = 0.047) showed that
participants scoring lower in the Non-Planning facet of Impulsivity
Table 1. Descriptive statistics (mean 6 SD) of personality measures and task performance.
Measures Total Sample Males Females t-value
Age 26.4767.14 28.4667.90 24.6065.79 3.56**
BIS-11 60.9068.99 60.9468.69 60.8769.31 0.05
Motor Impulsiveness 19.7064.15 19.5164.24 19.8764.08 20.55
Non-Planning 24.5164.19 24.6164.34 24.4264.06 0.29
Attentional Impulsiveness 16.6963.51 16.8163.34 16.5863.69 0.43
BIS-Anxiety 23.8065.05 22.1365.15 25.3864.43 24.33**
BAS Reward Responsiveness 20.3662.91 20.3762.87 20.3462.96 0.74
BAS Drive 12.0463.20 12.1963.02 11.9163.36 0.56
BAS Fun Seeking 11.2163.40 10.3663.23 11.0763.57 0.55
SSS-V 18.2465.99 19.2165.92 17.3165.94 2.05*
IGT-Net score 10.12624.49 14.35627.40 6.27621.08 1.50
IGT-v Net score 23.16626.40 26.45627.64 0.05625.06 21.1
Notes. BIS-11: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; BIS: Behavioural Inhibition System; BAS: Behavioural Approach Systems; SSS-V: Sensation Seeking Scale-v; IGT: Iowa Gambling
Task; IGT-v: variant of the Iowa Gambling Task; Net score is computed as difference between advantageous and disadvantageous deck selections; Total Sample: N = 165,
Males: N = 80, Females: N = 85; IGT: N = 84, Males = 40, Females: N = 44; IGT-v: N = 81, Males = 40, Females: N = 41; *p,.05, **p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058946.t001
Figure 1. Net scores in the five blocks as a function of IGT
version and Gender. Mean net scores in the five blocks of the original
(IGT, on the left) and modified (IGT-v, on the right) task versions for
males and females. Vertical bars denote +/20.95 confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058946.g001
Figure 2. Net scores as a function of IGT version for Impulsivity
and Sensation Seeking levels. Mean net scores in the original (IGT)
and modified (IGT-v) task versions for participants with Low vs. High
Impulsivity levels (A) and participants with Low vs. High Sensation
Seeking levels (B). Vertical bars denote +/20.95 confidence intervals,
*p#0.05, **p#0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058946.g002
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performed better (b = 20.32, t = 22.30, p = 0.02). As regards the
IGT-v, the traits included in the model accounted for more than
twice the variance of performance on the IGT-v than the same
traits accounted for in the model of performance on the IGT
(corrected R2 = 0.236; F(10,70) = 3.47, p = 0.001). For the IGT-v,
the Non-Planning (b = 20.28, t = 22.48, p = 0.01) and Attentional
Impulsivity (b = 20.24, t = 22.03, p = .046) facets negatively
impacted performance, whereas BIS-Anxiety positively impacted
performance (b = 0.27, t = 2.20, p = 0.03).
Deck selection analyses
The ANCOVA that focused on deck selection throughout the
task revealed a significant main effect of Deck Selection (F(3,480)
= 6.34, g2 = 0.04, p = 0.002), which was more clearly qualified by
the significant Deck Selection x Task Version interaction (F(3,480)
= 4.87, g2 = 0.03, p = 0.007, see Figure 3).
Post-hoc tests revealed that, in the IGT, there were significantly
more selections made from decks B and D than there were made
from decks A and C (all ps ,0.001). Participants generally
preferred decks with high-frequency gains – B and D – compared
with decks with low-frequency gains – A and C. Conversely, in the
IGT-v, the ‘‘prominent deck B effect’’ [25] was present, as there
were significantly more selections made from this deck as
compared with all other decks, including deck D (all ps ,0.05).
In addition, by directly comparing the two task versions, a
marginally significant effect (p = 0.055) was found for deck B in
particular, with more selections from this deck in the IGT-v than
in the IGT.
ANCOVAs that included the effects of personality variables
showed significant results only for Impulsivity, which interacted
with Deck Selection (F(3,468) = 5.80, g
2 = 0.04, p = 0.003). Post-hoc
tests revealed that highly impulsive participants made significantly
more selections from deck B (p = 0.01) and significantly fewer
selections from deck D (p = 0.04) compared with less impulsive
participants. Although the Impulsivity x Task Version x Deck
selection interaction can be considered only marginally significant
(F(3,468) = 3.56, g
2 = 0.02, p = 0.027, see Figure 4) after the p-level
correction (significance threshold: p = 0.008), it did help in
qualifying the Impulsivity x Deck Selection interaction.
Indeed, post-hoc tests in the three-way interaction showed that
the differences between high and low impulsive individuals were
present exclusively in the IGT-v (p = 0.002 for deck B; p = 0.01 for
deck D). In addition, whereas low impulsive participants did not
show differences in deck selection as a function of Task Version,
Table 2. Pearson correlation coefficients between self-report and behavioural variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. BIS-11 .78
2. Motor Impulsiveness .80** .68
3. Non-Planning .80** .48** .59
4. Attentional Impulsiveness .66** .29** .29** .67
5. BIS-anxiety .11 .04 2.02 .25** .84
6. BAS Reward Responsiveness .05 .12 2.15* .16* .28** .71
7. BAS Drive .14 .25** .03 .03 2.04 .34** .79
8. BAS Fun Seeking .54** .55** .33** .33** .01 .36** .32** .79
9. SSS-V .37** .35** .24** .24** 2.21** .13 .26** .46** .78
IGT Net score 2.08 2.05 2.23* .10 2.14 .21 2.07 .05 .17
IGT-v Net score 2.44** 2.30** 2.39** 2.29** .19 2.00 2.12 2.28* 2.36**
Notes. Cronbach’s Alpha reliability indexes are reported in the main diagonal; BIS-11: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; BAS: Behavioural Approach Systems scale; SSS-V:
Sensation Seeking Scale-v; IGT: Iowa Gambling Task; IGT-v: variant of the Iowa Gambling Task; * p#0.05, **p#0.01; bold values indicate significant correlations between
self-report measures and task performance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058946.t002
Figure 3. Selection from each deck as a function of IGT version.
Mean number of cards chosen from each deck in the original (IGT) and
modified (IGT-v) task versions. Vertical bars denote +/20.95 confidence
intervals, (*) p = 0.055,*p#0.05, ***p#0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058946.g003
Figure 4. Selection from each deck as a function of IGT version
for Impulsivity levels. Mean number of cards chosen from each deck,
in the original (IGT, on the left) and modified (IGT-v, on the right) task
versions for participants with Low vs. High. Impulsivity levels. Vertical
bars denote +/20.95 confidence intervals, **p#0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058946.g004
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highly impulsive individuals made significantly more selections
from deck B (p = 0.006) and significantly fewer selections from
deck D (p = 0.04) in the IGT-v as compared with the classic IGT.
Discussion
The present study was devoted to exploring the impact of
personality on decision making by using a variant of the IGT, the
IGT-v [18], in which the immediate rewarded value of disadvan-
tageous decks was increased while the long-term net gain of these
decks was kept intact. This manipulation of the reinforcement
schedule was aimed at magnifying the conflict between short- and
long-term gains, and preliminary results showed it severely
negatively impacted healthy participants’ performance [18]. To
the best of our knowledge, the IGT-v has not yet been used to
investigate personality differences that might affect decision
making in particular; therefore we have specifically addressed this
issue in the present study.
The significantly worsened performance of participants on the
IGT-v as compared with their performance on the original IGT
supports the notion that, independent of personality traits, the
more alluring pay-off of its disadvantageous decks allows it to
impair long-term, efficient decision making, as previously reported
by Van den Bos and colleagues [18]. Likewise, the fact that we
identified the ‘‘prominent deck B’’ effect [25] exclusively in the
IGT-v suggests that it allows for easier identification of suboptimal
decision making tendencies than the original IGT.
Males and females showed different performance along the
gain-loss magnitude dimension. Previous studies had reported
gender-based differences in IGT performance, with males
outperforming females in this task [13,17,26,27]. Although such
a pattern was not clear in the results of the present study, we did
identify a different learning effect in task performance as a function
of both task version and gender. Specifically, females performed
comparably in the two task versions, whereas males performed
significantly worse in the IGT-v than in the classic IGT (with
much of the decline occurring in the fifth block), showing to be
particularly sensitive to the increased conflict between short-term
and long-term gains. Since the more frequently reported
personality differences between genders involve the same traits
that are considered likely to affect decision making in the present
study (i.e., impulsivity, sensation seeking, anxiety), it is reasonable
to link the gender differences in performing the task to personality
differences. Although the present data are insufficient for drawing
strong conclusions, they offer a hint for future studies into the
relationship between gender and personality and how that
relationship might affect decision-making behaviors.
Turning attention to the effects of personality differences,
although further data are needed to corroborate the preliminary
findings of the present study, our results suggest that the IGT-v
could be a more sensitive tool than the classic IGT in disclosing
the effects of specific traits on choice behavior. We reason that the
classic IGT generates a conflict between short- and long-term
gains that can be too weak to make individual differences in
personality relevant to how choices are made. The only
personality trait that appeared to negatively influence performance
on the original IGT was Impulsivity – the Non-Planning facet, in
particular. The fact that such a component affected performance
on the IGT-v, as well, and that it did so to an even greater extent,
highlights the fundamental role a lack of planning (or a present-
orientation) plays in impairing emotional decision behavior. The
detrimental effects of impulsivity on the classic IGT have been
reported elsewhere [4,7–11]. Nevertheless, the small impact of
impulsivity on the original task may be the reason why its
damaging effects on IGT performance sometimes went undetected
[5,12,13]. We found that low impulsive participants outperformed
high impulsive participants in the last two blocks of trials, in
particular. Neurophysiological evidence suggests that different
brain systems are involved in tasks that require the individual to
evaluate immediate and delayed rewards [28]. Specifically, the
first stages of performance require an active reward system so that
the subject can learn or identify the best long-term options,
whereas the latter stages require an efficient cognitive self-control
system to keep the allure of immediate rewards at bay. Consistent
with this model, the high impulsive individuals’ performance
deterioration in the later IGT blocks suggests that they show a
comparative deficit in their self-control systems’ ability to maintain
the choice of the best long-term options. Analyses of individual
preferences for specific decks further supported the irrational
decision making of high impulsive participants, who showed a
‘‘prominent deck B’’ effect in the IGT-v – that is, a preference for
deck B selections [25]. In this regard, Takano and colleagues [10]
found that implicitly impulsive participants – i.e., those whose
impulsivity was assessed by a behavioral test – showed the same
preference for deck B in a modified version of the IGT
characterized by progressive changes in delayed punishments.
Our results extend these findings and support the ‘‘prominent deck
B’’ effect for self-rated impulsive individuals in another variant of
the IGT.
The anticipated effect of sensation seeking was also confirmed,
as this personality trait in fact exerted a negative influence in the
IGT-v. This was probably due to the higher level of arousal
associated with disadvantageous decks, which made them riskier
and thus more attractive to high sensation seekers.
In contrast with our expectations, BAS facets appeared to exert
little influence irrespective of IGT version, with the notable
exception of Fun Seeking, which was found to negatively correlate
with advantageous decision making in the IGT-v. Since this trait
shares many features with both sensation seeking and impulsivity
[21], the result is in line with the effects described above. As
regards the other BAS facets, one possible reason for the null
findings might be that the IGT, as well as the IGT-v, is less than
ideally suited to highlight BAS involvement in decision making,
due to the fact that it combines rewards, losses and risky outcomes
(i.e., disadvantageous options were characterized not only by the
greatest gains but also by the greatest losses). One possibility is that
individuals with high Reward Sensitivity might have noted this co-
occurrence and might have selected cards in order to preserve the
long-term gains, regardless of variations in the reinforcement
schedule. Indeed, unlike the Impulsivity dimension, which can be
typified by the Non-Planning component, the core meaning of
Reward Sensitivity is not directly associated with impaired
planning skills; rather, it includes components such as reward
responsiveness, persistence in the pursuit of rewards and fun
seeking. Therefore, it is possible that the limited planning abilities,
that drove more impulsive participants toward disadvantageous
decisions, did not affect the choice behavior of individuals who
scored high in Reward Sensitivity. Although this post-hoc
hypothesis requires further investigation, recent findings are
consistent with such a possibility [29], in that they show that gain
amount manipulations selectively interact with BAS Reward
Responsiveness in affective decision contexts in which reward
amount, loss amount and loss probability are kept separate,
through a full factorial design.
In line with our predictions, regression analyses have shown that
high levels of BIS-Anxiety seem to improve performance on the
IGT-v. It is likely that those who scored highly in this trait, by
experiencing greater levels of anxiety in the highly punitive
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contingencies of disadvantageous decks, were more inclined to
avoid them. This preliminary result, considered in conjunction
with the effects in the opposite direction previously found for this
trait in the original IGT (i.e., worse performance for more anxious
individuals; e.g., [4,30,31]), may suggest that some variables in the
decision context can be crucial in determining whether specific
personality variables favor or impair decision making. Although
further data are needed to validate this finding, such a pattern
stresses the importance of the decision context variables (in this
case, the magnitude of immediate punishments) in determining the
extent to which specific personality traits can alter decision
behaviors. In this respect, we think that a very fruitful approach in
this field of research – especially given its clinical implications –
could be the systematic investigation of the decision context
parameters that are able to impact choice behaviors by interacting
with specific personality traits (i.e., the magnitude and/or
frequency of rewards and punishments). Indeed, under some
circumstances, changes in such parameters might explain why
individuals with specific personality constellations can switch from
advantageous to disadvantageous decision making (or vice versa).
In conclusion, the current study shows that, by increasing the
conflict between short- and long-term gains in the IGT paradigm,
the effects exerted by personality on decision making are more
likely to emerge. Further studies are needed to test the robustness
of these preliminary findings and to estimate the external validity
of the IGT-v in predicting other risk behaviors. If further data are
found to be in line with our findings, we encourage the
deployment of the IGT-v, in lieu of the original IGT, in future
investigations of the impact of personality on healthy individuals’
choice behavior. Indeed, the IGT-v entirely preserves the original
task structure (i.e., it assessed affective decision making under
conditions of ambiguity and risk), while at the same time it seems
to be more sensitive than the original task version for disclosing
personality influences on choice behavior.
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